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THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISGUIDED
“ARM-OF-THE-STATE” ANALYSIS IN PELLITTERI
V. PRINE
Asher W. Lipsett*
“When courts are open and when they are shut . . . concerns all
citizens, not just the legal community.”
-John V. Orth

ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has determined that the Eleventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution exemplifies a greater principle of state
sovereign immunity that extends beyond the plain text of the
Amendment. When agents and instrumentalities of a state are sued and
claim sovereign immunity, courts examine whether these “arms of the
state” exercise state power to such an extent that they are entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because the Supreme Court has failed
to articulate a clear test for determining whether an entity acts as an
arm of the state, the Circuit Courts of Appeal have fashioned their own
tests coalesced around several factors.
The Eleventh Circuit first spelled out its arm-of-the-state test in the
2003 case of Manders v. Lee. The Eleventh Circuit examines whether
an entity acts as an arm of the state in the specific function at issue in
each case. In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit, using its Manders test, held
that a Georgia sheriff did not act as an arm of the state when
terminating employees. Curiously, in the 2015 case Pellitteri v. Prine,
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the Eleventh Circuit changed its mind—it held that the same Georgia
sheriff’s office with the same sheriff acted as an arm of the state when
exercising the same power to hire and fire employees.
This Comment examines the evolution of sovereign immunity
doctrine in the United States and discusses the Eleventh Circuit’s armof-the-state analysis in Manders and Pellitteri. This Comment then
argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Pellitteri was wrong and
proposes alternatives for how the court could arrive at its original,
correct decision—a Georgia sheriff does not act as an arm of the state
when making day-to-day employment decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Upon ratifying the United States Constitution in 1788, the Framers
“split the atom of sovereignty” to create a novel system of governance
called federalism, in which the state and national political spheres
would be “each protected from incursion by the other.”1 More than two
hundred years later, the American legal system continues to grapple
with the fallout from that political fission reaction; courts must
determine if they can entertain claims brought against either the federal
“sovereign” or the state “sovereign” because sovereign immunity is
accorded to both players in the federal system. 2 Historians, legal
scholars, and jurists have produced an immense amount of
commentary on sovereign immunity in the United States since the
founding of the country, and this Comment will focus on one narrow

1. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk
of tyranny and abuse from either front.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the
administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the
government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted
to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself.”).
2. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE 22 (2017) (“[B]oth the federal and state governments . . . are deemed
to have sovereign immunity and cannot be sued in any court without their consent.”). Courts may never
be able to divine the true nature of sovereign immunity:
The search for the original understanding on state sovereign immunity bears this
much resemblance to the quest for the Holy Grail: there is enough to be found so
that the faithful of whatever persuasion can find their heart’s desire. And, of course,
the object of the search may prove equally illusory.
JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 28 (1987). While courts contend with the intricacies of sovereign immunity in a
juridical context, the disciplines of history and political science also struggle to make sense of federalism
more broadly. See ROBERT W. HOFFERT, A POLITICS OF TENSIONS: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
AND AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS xi–xii (1992) (explaining that academic fields studying federalism have
not yet come to a uniform understanding of the meaning of federalism).
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facet of sovereign immunity—Eleventh Amendment immunity as it
applies to an “arm of the state.”3
An arm of the state can be characterized as any agent or
instrumentality of a state that operates as a de facto alter ego and is
thus accorded the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. 4 Because
states (and their arms by extension) are able to employ Eleventh
Amendment immunity as an absolute jurisdictional bar to suit,
defendants make frequent use of the immunity defense to avoid
litigating the actual merits of the case. 5 All manner of state agencies
and instrumentalities in every circuit have attempted to bring an
Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. 6
Despite the power and popularity of such a defense, the Supreme
Court has provided only general guidance as to how a lower court
might investigate a defendant’s claim that the party is essentially the
state even though the state is not mentioned by name in the suit. 7 The
3. The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr.,
75 F.3d 569, 574 (10th Cir. 1996); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see
also Kelsey Joyce Dayton, Tangled Arms: Modernizing and Unifying the Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 86
U. CHI. L. REV. 1603, 1605 (2019) (defining an “arm of the state” as “an entity so closely bound up with
the state that it accesses the state’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment”).
5. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3524.1 (3d ed. 2021) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE] (“Under the Eleventh
Amendment and more general notions of sovereign immunity, states usually are immune from private
suits without their consent.”). There are generally three narrow exceptions to Eleventh Amendment
immunity: (1) A person can sue a state actor in federal court for prospective injunctive relief under the
legal doctrine created by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); (2) A state may waive its immunity or
“otherwise consent to suit;” and (3) Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. § 3524.
6. E.g., Royal Caribbean Corp. v. P.R. Ports Auth., 973 F.2d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1992) (Puerto Rico Ports
Authority); Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 260 (2d Cir. 1996) (state department of corrections); Christy
v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1995) (turnpike commission); Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d
426, 430 (4th Cir. 1995) (county health department); Duncan v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 469 F.
App’x 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2012) (public university); Dubuc v. Mich. Bd. of L. Exam’rs, 342 F.3d 610, 614
(6th Cir. 2003) (board of law examiners and state bar); Landers Seed Co. v. Champaign Nat. Bank, 15
F.3d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1994) (state supreme court); Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 640
F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2011) (public education employee retirement system); Durning v. Citibank, N.A.,
950 F.2d 1419, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991) (community development authority); Haldeman v. Wyo. Farm Loan
Bd., 32 F.3d 469, 469 (10th Cir. 1994) (farm loan board); Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1523
(11th Cir. 1990) (sheriff’s office).
7. See Alex E. Rogers, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in
the Eleventh Amendment Arm-Of-The-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1243, 1269 (1992) (“The
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Court can examine “the essential nature and effect of the proceeding,”
the “nature of the entity created by state law,” and if “the action is in
essence one for the recovery of money from the state” to make the
arm-of-the-state determination. 8 Following these guidelines, federal
circuit courts generally make use of the following factors to conduct
their analyses: state-law definitions of the entity, entity autonomy,
entity powers, and entity funding. 9 In Manders v. Lee, the Eleventh
Circuit first clearly delineated its unique version of the circuit courts’
general factors used to make an arm-of-the-state determination: (1)
how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the state
maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and
(4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.10
In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit decided Pellitteri v. Prine, holding that
a county sheriff in the State of Georgia “acts as an ‘arm of the State’
when exercising his power to hire and fire the deputies that enforce the
laws of Georgia on his behalf,” and is thus accorded Eleventh
Amendment immunity against the plaintiff’s claims brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).11 This
was certainly a puzzling judicial reversal—just three years earlier, in
Supreme Court’s multifactored balancing approach to arm-of-the-state questions—devoid of guidance
with respect to the relative weight or importance of each criterion—has afforded lower courts excessive
discretion in fashioning their own formulae.”).
8. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 519 U.S. at 429–30 (first quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury
of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); and then quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)).
9. See FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 3524.2; see also Rogers, supra note 7
(“The myriad factors employed by the lower courts fall into five broad categories: (1) whether the entity
performs governmental or proprietary functions and, alternatively, whether it performs state or local
functions; (2) the degree of state political and administrative control and influence over the entity; (3) the
nature of the powers that the entity enjoys, especially the extent of its fiscal autonomy from the state; (4)
the state-law definition of the entity, including state courts’ characterization of the entity; and (5) whether
the state treasury would be used to satisfy a judgment against the entity.”).
10. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“In Eleventh Amendment cases,
this Court uses four factors to determine whether an entity is an ‘arm of the State’ in carrying out a
particular function: (1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains
over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the
entity.”). In cases at both the district court and circuit court levels since the Manders decision, courts in
the Eleventh Circuit ubiquitously refer to these four factors as “Manders factors.” E.g., Freyre v.
Chronister, 910 F.3d 1371, 1380–81 (11th Cir. 2018); Miller v. Advantage Behav. Health Sys., 677 F.
App’x 556, 559, 560 (11th Cir. 2017); McRae v. Telfair Cnty., No. CV 318-077, 2020 WL 5608637, at
*5 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 18, 2020).
11. Pellitteri v. Prine, 776 F.3d 777, 779 (11th Cir. 2015).
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the unpublished decision of Keene v. Prine, the same court held that
the same Georgia sheriff’s office (with the same sheriff) did not act as
an arm of the state when exercising the same power to hire and fire
deputies.12 Pellitteri thus explicitly overruled Keene, and the court
explained in its second opinion that it made sure it got the
arm-of-the-state determination correct on the second attempt. 13
This Comment seeks to illustrate how the court’s decision in
Pellitteri was incorrect, setting a dangerous precedent for plaintiffs
who bring similar civil rights and employment discrimination claims
against purported arms of the state. Part I reviews the history of
sovereign immunity in the United States and Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence since the amendment’s 1795 ratification.14 Part II
discusses the arm-of-the-state doctrine and examines the Pellitteri
decision in the context of the Eleventh Circuit’s Manders factors.15
Part III argues that the court erred in its arm-of-the-state analysis in
Pellitteri and provides alternative frameworks that the court could use
to correct itself once again.16
I. BACKGROUND
To understand the current reasons for and effects of arm-of-the-state
analyses, it is important to trace the origin and development of
sovereign immunity doctrine in the United States since the Founding.
A. Sovereign Immunity at the Founding
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once reasoned that “[a] sovereign
is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
12. Keene v. Prine, 477 F. App’x 575, 576–77 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
13. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 779, 781. The text of the Pellitteri opinion itself serves as evidence that the
court took great pains to distance itself from its earlier decision in Keene v. Prine. See, e.g., id. at 779
(“The District Court denied Sheriff Prine’s motion to dismiss, relying on this Court’s unpublished opinion
in Keene . . . .”); id. at 781 (“Admittedly, we stated in Keene that . . . .”); id. (“Upon further review,
however, we believe that this conclusion in Keene was mistaken on two fronts.”); id. (“Second, our
conclusion in Keene was also flawed because . . . .”).
14. See discussion infra Part I.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part III.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

7

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 12

542

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:2

theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends.”17 Prior to the Revolutionary War, the King of England
served as the sovereign that made the law in the American Colonies,
and the Founders necessarily responded to a long line of English
common law that declared the sovereign (the King) as the ultimate
rulemaking authority who, legally speaking, could do no wrong.18
When the colonies revolted and gained independence from a unitary
sovereign, the Framers took to the task of establishing a new national
government (after the Articles of Confederation failed
spectacularly).19 The Framers debated the nature and scope of the new
founding document known as the Constitution. 20 Of particular note
was Article III, which established the judicial branch of the federal
government.21 Despite the apparent holdover of English common-law

17. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
18. See 1 WILLIAM C. SPRAGUE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, ABRIDGED 49 (9th ed. 1915)
(“And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty or pre-eminence. Hence it is, that no
suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction
over him.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“When the Constitution was ratified, it was well
established in English law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its own courts.”); see also
SPRAGUE, supra, at 51 (“The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even thinking
wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing; in him is no folly or weakness.”). But see Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 105 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]here was no consensus on the issue
[of whether states would retain their sovereign immunity at the time of ratification] . . . . There was, on
the contrary, a clear disagreement, which was left to fester during the ratification period, to be resolved
only thereafter.” (citations omitted)); id. at 137 (“While the States had limited their reception of English
common law to principles appropriate to American conditions, the 1787 draft Constitution contained no
provision for adopting the common law at all . . . in sharp contrast to the state constitutions . . . virtually
all of which contained explicit provisions dealing with common-law reception.”); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1963) (describing the
“doctrine and practice” of various common law exceptions that allowed parties to seek legal remedies
against the Crown “at the time the Constitution was drafted”). For example, the signers of the Declaration
of Independence certainly did not agree with the King’s actions and had formally petitioned for redress.
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“The history of the present King of Great
Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an
absolute Tyranny over these States.”); id. at para. 3 (“In every stage of these Oppressions We have
Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by
repeated injury.”).
19. See Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1817, 1853–62 (2010) (describing the ratification debates among the Federalist and Antifederalist factions
of the Founders).
20. Id. at 1862 (“Once Antifederalists agreed that the Articles of Confederation were flawed beyond
repair, they began to scrutinize the new plan.”).
21. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. III.
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sovereign immunity in the new country, Article III, Section Two
extends the judicial power “to Controversies . . . between a State and
Citizens of another State” and “between a State . . . and
foreign . . . Citizens.”22 A plain reading of Article III thus suggests that
federal courts (at the time of the Founding, the Supreme Court only)
surely had original jurisdiction over suits between a state and
out-of-state citizens. Yet some ratification debates at the time centered
around the prospective overreach of the clause and its incompatibility
with state sovereign immunity. 23
The Antifederalists cried foul that such suits would subject states to
the litigious whims of the people so that the Constitution would compel
states to appear in court just like common criminals. Meanwhile, the
Federalists sought to assuage these fears and asserted that the new
federal government would not force states’ compliance.24 Given the

22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1045–54 (1983) (describing the Federalist and Antifederalist debates over the
“state-citizen diversity clause” of Article III, Section Two).
24. Speaking to the Virginia Convention, Antifederalist George Mason made his opinion of Article
III, Section Two clear: “Is this State to be brought to the bar of justice like a delinquent individual?—Is
the sovereignty of the State to be arraigned like a culprit, or private offender?—Will the States undergo
this mortification? I think this power perfectly unnecessary.” George Mason, Address to The Virginia
Convention (June 19, 1788), reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1406 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993). In one of a series of Antifederalist essays written
by an unknown Antifederalist under a pen name, “Brutus,” voiced similar concerns:
But, I conceive the clause which extends the power of the judicial to controversies
arising between a state and citizens of another state, improper in itself, and will, in
its exercise, prove most pernicious and destructive. It is improper, because it
subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of an individual. This is
humiliating and degrading to a government, and, what I believe, the supreme
authority of no state ever submitted to.
Brutus, Letter XIII, N.Y.J., Feb. 21, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 428, 429
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Alexander Hamilton responded in Federalist No. 81:
It has been suggested that an assignment of the public securities of one State to the
citizens of another would enable them to prosecute that State in the federal courts
for the amount of those securities; a suggestion which the following considerations
prove to be without foundation. It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense
and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless,
therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will
remain with the States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487–88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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common understanding of legal terminology at the time, it appears that
the Federalists had the winning argument.25 Despite the pronounced
Antifederalist concern, the term “sovereign immunity” does not appear
anywhere in the Constitution. 26
B. Chisholm v. Georgia
If there was any residual doubt as to the status of state sovereign
immunity after ratification, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm
v. Georgia, the Court’s “first important case,” brought the debate front
and center in the national conversation. 27 Alexander Chisholm, a South
Carolina citizen and executor of a South Carolinian’s estate, brought
an action in assumpsit against the State of Georgia to recover unpaid
Revolutionary War debt. 28 Arguing for Chisholm, Edmund Randolph
(who was then-Attorney General of the United States) made the case
that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the suit because of the
plain language of the citizen-state diversity clause of Article III,
Section Two.29 The State of Georgia did not enter an appearance, citing
sovereign immunity.30
The Justices delivered their opinions in seriatim form on February
18, 1793.31 Justices Jay, Blair, Wilson, and Cushing relied on the plain
25. Caleb Nelson has argued that the terms “case” and “controversy” meant something very different
for the Founding Fathers. See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1565 (2002) (“Although Article III of the Constitution extends the federal
government’s judicial power to various ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ many members of the Founding
generation thought that a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ did not exist unless both sides either voluntarily
appeared or could be haled before the court. Traditionally, courts could not command unconsenting states
to appear at the behest of an individual. For many members of the Founding generation, Article III did
nothing to change this system: if a state did not consent to suit, there would be no ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’
over which the federal government could exercise judicial power.”).
26. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (2001) (“The text
of the Constitution is silent about sovereign immunity. Not one clause of the first seven articles even
remotely hints at the idea of governmental immunity from suits.”); see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419, 454 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“To the Constitution of the United States the term
SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown.”).
27. See generally Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419; ORTH, supra note 2, at 12.
28. ORTH, supra note 2, at 12.
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id.; Clark, supra note 19, at 1878 (“The Georgia House of Representatives passed a resolution on
December 14, 1792, denying that Article III of the Constitution gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to
hear the case, and declaring that Georgia would regard any judgment as unconstitutional.”).
31. ORTH, supra note 2, at 12–13.
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language of Article III, Section Two to find that Chisholm could
certainly bring his suit against the State of Georgia. 32 Chief Justice Jay
found the constitutional clause to be “express, positive, [and] free from
ambiguity” and that federal jurisdiction over controversies between
citizens and states was supported not only by the express language of
the Constitution but also by its “spirit.”33 Chief Justice Jay reasoned
that it “would contradict and do violence to the great and leading
principles of a free and equal national government” if states could
avoid suits due to some implication of sovereign immunity.34 Justice
Wilson opined that the concept of state sovereignty was totally foreign
to the Constitution, that the free men of the United States were citizens
and not royal subjects, and that the citizens surrendered their
sovereignty to the nation, not the individual states. 35
Only Justice Iredell disagreed with the other Justices.36 Relying on
English common law, Iredell maintained that plaintiffs could not bring
actions in assumpsit against states much like how English subjects
could not bring actions in assumpsit against the Crown without royal
consent.37 Justice Iredell reasoned that the states’ collective surrender
of powers was limited to those clearly “delegated” to the Union and

32. Clark, supra note 19, at 1879 (describing Chisholm as the Court’s “first major textualist decision”);
see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890) (discussing that the majority in Chisholm was “swayed
by a close observance of the letter of the constitution, without regard to former experience and
usage . . . see[ing] in this language a power to enable the individual citizens of one state . . . to sue another
state of the Union in the federal courts”).
33. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 476–77 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
34. Id. at 477.
35. Id. at 456–57 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“In one sense, the term sovereign has for its correlative,
subject, [i]n this sense, the term can receive no application; for it has no object in the Constitution of the
United States. Under that Constitution there are citizens, but no subjects . . . .As a Judge of this Court, I
know, and can decide upon the knowledge, that the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large
scale of the Union, as a part of the ‘People of the United States,’ did not surrender the Supreme or
Sovereign Power to that State; but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves. As to the
purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a sovereign State.”).
36. See id. at 429–50 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Justice Iredell’s opinion is best characterized as a
“dissent” in modern terminology because the court issued seriatim opinions prior to John Marshall’s chief
justiceship in 1801.
37. Id. at 445 (“Thus, it appears, that in England even in case of a private debt contracted by the King,
in his own person, there is no remedy but by petition, which must receive his express sanction, otherwise
there can be no proceeding upon it.”).
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that their common-law sovereign immunity remained reserved to
them.38
If there was any disagreement as to the role sovereign immunity
played in limiting federal jurisdiction over the several states that
constituted the new republic, the Supreme Court quickly dispatched
that notion—the people of the whole United States, and not the
constituent states, were the true sovereigns. 39
C. The Eleventh Amendment and Ensuing Jurisprudence
Unsurprisingly, states were displeased with the result of Chisholm
v. Georgia, and the decision “created . . . a shock of surprise
throughout the country.”40 Several states had taken on a great deal of
debt to finance the Revolutionary War, and the Court had opened the
courthouse doors to creditors seeking to make good on states’ unpaid
war debts.41 Less than one month after the Court’s decision, Congress
proposed the Eleventh Amendment, and it received the requisite
number of ratification votes by February 7, 1795. 42 The Eleventh
Amendment reads: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another

38. Id. at 435 (“No other part of the common law of England, it appears to me, can have any reference
to this subject, but that part of it which prescribes remedies against the crown. Every State in the Union
in every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States, I consider to be as
completely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the powers surrendered . . . .[T]he United
States have no claim to any authority but such as the States have surrendered to them: [o]f course the part
not surrendered must remain as it did before.”).
39. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (“[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty
devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country . . . .”).
40. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
41. Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342,
1361 (1989) (“By opening the doors of the federal courts to foreign citizens’ suits against states,
Chisholm . . . threatened the states with huge liabilities . . . .”); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264,
406 (1821) (“[A]t the adoption of the constitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the
apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a very serious objection
to that instrument.”). The United States’ debt ballooned to approximately $450 million by the end of the
Revolutionary War. Janet A. Riesman, Money, Credit, and Federalist Political Economy, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 128, 130
(Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
42. ORTH, supra note 2, at 20.
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State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State,” and it expressly
overrules the Court’s decision in Chisholm.43
The text of the Eleventh Amendment is clear—federal courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction over suits “commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State.”44 Nevertheless, by
virtue of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hans v. Louisiana roughly a
century after its decision in Chisholm, the Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment also barred suits against states brought by their own
citizens.45 The Court reasoned that it would be “almost an absurdity on
its face” to construe the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits by citizens
of other states but not suits by states’ own citizens.46 Echoing Justice
Iredell’s original dissenting argument in Chisholm, the Court found
that states had not surrendered their common-law sovereign immunity
at the Founding.47
Hans is still good law, and the decision kicked off the Court’s
continued expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment beyond its
plain language to reflect a larger doctrinal principle of sacrosanct
sovereign immunity.48 In more modern times, the Supreme Court,
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 382 (1798) (“[T]he
[Eleventh] amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could not be exercised any jurisdiction, in
any case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or
subjects, of any foreign state.”).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
45. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 16 (“The suability of a state, without its consent, was a thing unknown to the law. This has
been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally
asserted. It was fully shown by an exhaustive examination of the old law by Mr. Justice I REDELL in his
opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia; and it has been conceded in every case since . . . .”); Accord Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721 (1999) (“[D]espite the opinion of Justice Iredell, the majority failed to address
either the practice or the understanding that prevailed in the States at the time the Constitution was
adopted.”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 84 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court in
Hans relied expressly on the reasoning of Justice Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm, which, of course, was
premised on the view that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity was a common-law rule that Congress
had directed federal courts to respect . . . .”).
48. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1253 (“States are shielded from the consequences of their illegal
conduct not merely in diversity suits, but in federal question actions brought by their own citizens, in
claims by foreign sovereigns, and sovereign Native American tribes, and in admiralty suits. Although
these rules do not find support in the language of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court interprets the
Amendment as embodying the doctrine of state sovereign immunity rather than as providing jurisdictional
bar to a narrow category of suits against the states.”); see also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
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under Chief Justice Rehnquist, “dramatically expand[ed]” the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment. 49 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
the Court held that Congress could only abrogate state sovereign
immunity by using its powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.50 In Alden v. Maine, the Court held that sovereign
immunity prohibited states from being sued under federal law for
private damages in their own state courts, absent state consent. 51 This
modern jurisprudence reflects the Rehnquist majority’s view that
“sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but
from the structure of the original Constitution itself.”52 The current
doctrine of sovereign immunity thus reflects two “dual goals”: (1) it
protects the state’s treasury from a financial drain and (2) it protects
the more abstract “dignity” of the state from being subjected to suit by

513 U.S. 30, 53 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The [Supreme] Court’s decisions have given us ‘two
Eleventh Amendments,’ one narrow and textual and the other—not truly a constitutional doctrine at all—
based on prudential considerations of comity and federalism.”).
49. Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1202. This broad “immunity” view of the Eleventh Amendment
can be contrasted with a narrower “diversity” view. See William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (1989) (“Briefly stated,
the diversity explanation is that the Eleventh Amendment was designed to overrule Chisholm by
eliminating the state-citizen diversity jurisdiction from Article III. In more complicated but more precise
terms, the amendment required that the state-citizen diversity clause be construed to authorize jurisdiction
only when the state was a plaintiff; when the state was a defendant, the clause was not to be construed to
authorize jurisdiction . . . . So understood, the Eleventh Amendment was not intended to eliminate or
restrict other heads of jurisdiction. If jurisdiction existed over a suit against a state under the admiralty
jurisdiction or the federal question jurisdiction before passage of the amendment, such jurisdiction
continued to exist after its passage.”).
50. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47. In a different context, the Supreme Court has since determined
that states waived their sovereign immunity regarding in rem bankruptcy jurisdiction by ratifying the
Bankruptcy Clause contained within Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution. See generally Cent. Va.
Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
51. Alden, 527 U.S. at 728; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1203.
52. Alden, 527 U.S. at 728; Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002)
(quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 723) (“Instead of explicitly memorializing the full breadth of the sovereign
immunity retained by the States when the Constitution was ratified, Congress chose in the text of the
Eleventh Amendment only to ‘address the specific provisions of the Constitution that had raised concerns
during the ratification debates and formed the basis of the Chisholm decision.’ As a result, the Eleventh
Amendment does not define the scope of the States’ sovereign immunity; it is but one particular
exemplification of that immunity.”); see also Clark, supra note 19, at 1826 (“The immunity theory—the
Supreme Court’s dominant approach since 1890—regards the text of the Eleventh Amendment as
underinclusive, and therefore recognizes more state sovereign immunity than the text provides.”).
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private individuals.53 It is within this broad sovereign immunity milieu
that the arm-of-the-state analysis finds itself today. 54
II. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has made clear that the “state” in the abstract is
so dignified as to repel suits by private individuals. 55 But the state is
not abstract when it manifests itself through its “state agents and state
instrumentalities.”56 Chief Justice John Marshall once maintained that
“the jurisdiction of the [Supreme] Court depends . . . upon the actual
party on the record.”57 The more modern Court came to the opposite
conclusion in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury and found
that the state is the “real, substantial party in interest” when the suit in
question is brought “for the recovery of money from the state.”58 The

53. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 3524; cf. Hess, 513 U.S. at 48 (“[T]he
impetus for the Eleventh Amendment [is] the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out
of a State’s treasury.”); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)
(“The [Eleventh] Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain
attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity . . . . It thus accords the States the respect owed
them as members of the federation.” (citations omitted)); Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (“The
very object and purpose of the eleventh amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a state to
the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties. It was thought to be neither
becoming nor convenient that the several states of the Union, invested with that large residuum of
sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to
answer to complaints of private persons . . . .”).
54. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1243 (“The Court has neglected to fashion an arm-of-the-state doctrine
that is informed by, and advances, the principles of federalism that pervade the larger corpus of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence.”).
55. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 3524. Accord Alden, 527 U.S. at 712;
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
56. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not
a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office . . . . As such, it is no different
from a suit against the State itself.” (citation omitted)); FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
5, § 3524.2 (“[A] suit will often be against some political subdivision or agency of the state, or against
individuals employed by such a subdivision or agency. In these cases, a federal court must determine
whether such a defendant—for example, a city, a county, a multi-state agency, a public school, even an
individual such as a governor and other officer—should be considered an “arm of the state” and therefore
entitled to the state’s immunity.”).
57. Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 857 (1824).
58. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); see also Ex parte Ayers,
123 U.S. at 487 (“It must be regarded as the settled doctrine of this court . . . ‘that the question whether a
suit is within the prohibition of the eleventh amendment is not always determined by reference to the
nominal parties on the record.’” (quoting Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 287 (1885))).
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state can thus invoke its sovereign immunity defense on behalf of those
agents and instrumentalities even when not named as a party in the
suit.59
A. The Arm-of-the-State Factors Generally
Because only instrumentalities that exercise a bona fide “slice of
state power” act as arms of the state, political subdivisions such as
local counties and municipalities are generally not deemed to be such
arms.60 The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between political
entities of the state and entities that happen to lie within the state’s
geographic territory.61 The state–county dichotomy poses difficult
questions for entities that share both local and state character. 62 For
example, in Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle, the Supreme Court concluded that, on balance, a local school
board in Ohio was “more like a county or city than it is like an arm of
the State” and was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 63
In making its arm-of-the-state determination, the Court examined the
59. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464; Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 519 U.S. at 429.
60. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 3524.2 (“Counties, municipalities,
municipal agencies, and officers thereof, usually are not considered arms of the state, and thus usually are
not entitled to immunity.”).
61. See Lake Country Ests., Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400–01 (1979) (“By its
terms, the protection afforded by that Amendment is only available to ‘one of the United
States’ . . . . [T]he Court has consistently refused to construe the Amendment to afford protection to
political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Lincoln Cnty. v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (“The eleventh amendment limits the jurisdiction only as to suits against
a state . . . . [W]hile the county is territorially a part of the state, yet politically it is also a corporation
created by, and with such powers as are given to it by, the state. In this respect, it is a part of the state only
in that remote sense in which any city, town, or other municipal corporation may be said to be a part of
the state.”).
62. See Dayton, supra note 4, at 1617 (“Not everything that a local entity does is pursuant to a local
policy; states can and do direct local entities and offices to conduct certain actions.”); id. at 1623
(“Political entities of a ‘hybrid’ character have features of both state agencies and largely independent
public corporations . . . .”); see also Jameson B. Bilsborrow, Keeping the Arms in Touch: Taking Political
Accountability Seriously in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 64 EMORY L.J. 819, 822
(2015) (“Arm-of-the-state analysis is complicated by the fact that in recent decades, state and local
government structures have evolved considerably. Increasingly specialized government entities offer a
variety of public services beyond classic core governmental functions, and government has grown while
simultaneously becoming more fragmented through privatization, revenue sharing, and decentralization.
These processes have produced a limitless variety of government entities, and when litigants sue such
entities, courts must decide whether these entities are arms of the state.”).
63. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280–81 (1977).
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school board’s definition under Ohio law, its ability to raise funds, and
the degree of autonomy it enjoyed. 64 Similarly, in Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court found that
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, as an interstate pact between
California and Nevada, was akin to an “agency comparable to a county
or municipality” and was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.65 As it did in Mount Healthy, in making the arm-of-the-state
determination, the Court examined the agency’s definition under the
compact, its sources of funding, and its ability to be overruled by
state-level actors.66
Since the Supreme Court’s first attempts to conduct arm-of-the-state
analyses in the 1970s, no bright-line rule has emerged as to the exact
factors to use or the weight to be accorded to each one.67 As a result,
the lower circuit courts have devised their own disparate “dense tangle
of factors” to make arm-of-the-state determinations across the country
with differing, unpredictable results. 68 For example, in Port Authority
Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve a split between the Second and Third Circuit Courts of
Appeal regarding the question of whether a New York and New Jersey
bi-state port authority could claim Eleventh Amendment immunity
from the suit.69 Using the guidelines established in Lake Country
Estates, the Second Circuit held that the port authority did not enjoy
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Using the same test, the Third Circuit
64. Id.
65. Lake Country Ests., Inc., 440 U.S. at 401.
66. Id. at 401–02.
67. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 7.
68. Id.; Bilsborrow, supra note 62, at 829–30 (“The decades since [Mount] Healthy have produced the
following: four Supreme Court sample case analyses, none of which purport to offer a systematic
arm-of-the-state test or a formalized list of factors; two competing Eleventh Amendment rationales
intended to guide the factor analysis; twelve very different circuit court tests, each with their own twists,
measuring a litany of factors that vary by circuit; and scores of lower court precedents classifying a
limitless variety of entities as arms of their respective states shielded with their state’s sovereign
immunity, or else not, with outcomes varying not only circuit by circuit but state by state within a given
circuit.”); see also Leitner v. Westchester Cmty. Coll., 779 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The Supreme
Court has not articulated a clear standard for determining whether a state entity is an ‘arm of the state’
entitled to sovereign immunity, and the Circuits have applied different tests for establishing sovereign
immunity.”); Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The jurisprudence
over how to apply the arm-of-the-state doctrine is, at best, confused.”).
69. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 302–04 (1990).
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came to the opposite conclusion. 70 The Supreme Court concluded that
New York and New Jersey had waived their Eleventh Amendment
immunity by consenting to suit through the inclusion of a statutory
venue provision, and the Court unhelpfully failed to clarify the
disparate arm-of-the-state analyses conducted in the lower courts. 71
B. The Eleventh Circuit’s Manders Analysis
As a result of the Supreme Court’s inability (or unwillingness) to
articulate a clear standard for determining when an entity is an arm of
the state, the circuit courts have fashioned their own sets of factors. 72
With varying degrees of weight and importance, the circuit courts look
to the following five general guiding factors:
(1) whether the entity performs governmental or proprietary
functions and, alternatively, whether it performs state or
local functions; (2) the degree of state political and
administrative control and influence over the entity; (3) the
nature of the powers that the entity enjoys, especially the
extent of its fiscal autonomy from the state; (4) the state-law
definition of the entity, including state courts’
characterization of the entity; and (5) whether the state
treasury would be used to satisfy a judgment against the

70. Id. at 302 (“[T]he Third Circuit reasoned that because the States had established the Authority as
a state agency and continued to exercise extensive control over its operations, the Authority was entitled
to Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit . . . concluded that
PATH did not enjoy the States’ sovereign immunity, principally because the treasuries of New York and
New Jersey are largely insulated from PATH’s liabilities.”).
71. Id. at 306–08; see also Rogers, supra note 7, at 1268 (“Rather than addressing the arm-of-the-state
confrontation engendered by diametrically opposite circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court skirted the
issue entirely. Instead, a unanimous Supreme Court viewed the venue provision as an explicit waiver by
the states of Eleventh Amendment immunity for the Authority.”).
72. Dayton, supra note 4, at 1627 (“In light of the [Supreme] Court’s general lack of clarity regarding
what factors courts should consider, the circuits have developed their own various arm-of-the-state
tests.”); Rogers, supra note 7 (“The Supreme Court’s multifactored balancing approach to
arm-of-the-state questions—devoid of guidance with respect to the relative weight or importance of each
criterion—has afforded lower courts excessive discretion in fashioning their own formulae.”).
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entity.73
The Eleventh Circuit distilled its choice of factors to four in the 2003
case of Manders v. Lee.74 In 1997, deputies of the Clinch County
sheriff’s office in Georgia arrested Willie Manders and beat him while
they placed him in a holding cell. 75 Manders brought a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Winston Peterson, in his official
capacity, and against his deputies.76 The court employed the following
factors in determining if an entity is an “‘arm of the state’ in carrying
out a particular function: (1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what
degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the
entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments
against the entity.”77
The court found that first, under state law, Georgia sheriff’s offices
are independent of their counties and perform law-enforcement duties
(here, the use-of-force policy at the local jail) on behalf of the state. 78
73. Rogers, supra note 7. Taken as a whole, these five factors provide courts with a clear guide as to
what the means might be in making an arm-of-the-state determination and encompass the “dual goals” of
sovereign immunity—state dignity and state treasury preservation. See F EDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 3524.
74. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The court amalgamated a variety
of cases since 1984 to create its four-factor test. See id.
75. Id. at 1306.
76. Id. at 1307. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Johnson v. Montgomery Cnty. Cmty. Punishment & Corr. Auth., No.
18-cv-568, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127228, at *7 (M.D. Ala. July 31, 2019) (“Section 1983 provides a
mechanism whereby civil rights plaintiffs may bring actions to redress violations of federally protected
rights.” (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961))); Joseph G. Cook & John L. Sobieski, Jr., Civil
Rights Actions, ¶¶ 10.01–10.03 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2021) (explaining that Section 1983 actions are
frequently brought against law enforcement officers, especially for the officers’ use of excessive force).
77. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1309.
78. Id. at 1310 (citing GA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1–2); id. at 1318–19; see also Bd. of Comm’rs v. Wilson,
396 S.E.2d 903, 903 (Ga. 1990) (“The sheriff . . . is an elected, constitutional officer; he is subject to the
charge of the General Assembly and is not an employee of the county commission.”). But see GA. CONST.
art. IX, § 1, para. 3 (listing the position of sheriff, among others, as a “county officer”); Manders, 338
F.3d at 1335 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“The Georgia Constitution is unequivocal in its designation of
sheriffs as ‘county officers’ . . . . This designation of sheriffs as independent county officers militates
against considering them arms of the state in any of their official functions.”).
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Next, the court found that the State of Georgia exercised “direct and
substantial control over the sheriff’s duties, training, and discipline” in
the context of the use-of-force policy.79 Third, the court found that the
involvement of state funds “to some extent” as to the use-of-force
policy was “sufficient to tilt” towards immunity.80 Lastly, the court
reasoned that even though neither the state nor the county would be
required to pay an adverse judgment against the sheriff in his official
capacity, both state and county funds would be implicated
“indirectly.”81
Although
finding
that
this
“responsibility-for-judgments-against-the-entity” factor did not
decidedly tilt in favor of immunity like the first three factors, the court
nevertheless determined that its insipid treatment of the factor did not
“defeat immunity.”82 Weighing all these factors, the court concluded
that Sheriff Peterson’s office acted as an arm of the state in developing
its use-of-force policy at a local jail and was thus accorded Eleventh
Amendment immunity.83
Going forward, the court decided that its arm-of-the-state inquiry
would focus on the particular function at issue in making the
arm-of-the-state determination. 84 As such, the court did not determine
79. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1322. But see id. at 1339 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“A proper examination of
county jails and sheriffs’ role in running them gives no indication of state control.”).
80. Id. at 1323–24. But see id. at 1345 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“[The majority] reaches this conclusion
via a route that begins with its mistaken conception of the function at issue in this case. The majority relies
on its novel notion of a ‘force policy’ function to set aside statutes requiring counties to pay for the jail’s
construction, upkeep, and operations.”).
81. Id. at 1329. But see id. at 1346 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“[The majority] wrongly concludes . . . that
Georgia law . . . unequivocally protects counties from liability for their sheriffs’ actions.”).
82. Id. at 1328–29 (“The State’s ‘integrity’ is not limited to who foots the bill, and, at a minimum, the
liability-for-adverse-judgment factor does not defeat Sheriff Peterson’s immunity claim.”); see also, e.g.,
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994) (“[C]urrent Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence emphasizes the integrity retained by each State in our federal system.”); Fed. Mar. Comm’n
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (“The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity
is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”).
83. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1328. But see id. at 1347 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“In this case, each of the
factors we normally apply to determine whether a defendant is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
weighs against extending such protection to Sheriff Peterson. Georgia law clearly defines Sheriff Peterson
as a county officer and jails as county institutions; the state’s corrections authorities exercise no control
over Sheriff Peterson in his operation of the county jail; Clinch County appropriates Sheriff Peterson’s
operating budget and pays for the jail’s construction and upkeep; and there is no indication that a judgment
against Sheriff Peterson would operate against the state of Georgia.”).
84. Id. at 1309; see also id. at 1308 (“Whether a defendant is an ‘arm of the State’ must be assessed
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that the sheriff in Manders wore a “state hat” as an arm of the state for
any function other than establishing use-of-force policy at the local jail
and in training and disciplining his deputies regarding that policy.85
The Eleventh Circuit assesses all defendants who employ an Eleventh
Amendment immunity defense under this function-dependent
approach, not just sheriff’s offices.86
The Eleventh Circuit is unique among the federal circuit courts
because it is the only Circuit that consistently applies an
“activity-based” approach to arm-of-the-state analyses.87 This activity
or function-based approach differs greatly from that of the majority of
circuits which employ an “entity-based” approach to arm-of-the-state
analyses where the entity is or is not an arm of the state “regardless of
the activity at issue.”88 Theoretically, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach
allows courts to most faithfully enforce the spirit of the Eleventh
in light of the particular function in which the defendant was engaged when taking the actions out of
which liability is asserted to arise.”); id. at 1318–19 (“Having examined Georgia’s law governing sheriffs,
we now specifically apply the Eleventh Amendment factors to Sheriff Peterson’s particular functions in
issue.”); id. at 1333 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“The point of identifying the pertinent governmental function
in each case is to keep our analysis focused on the discrete set of positive state law authorities that define
the particular area of official responsibility at issue.”); cf. McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 785
(1997) (explaining that, in the context of liability for counties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, a court
should inquire as to whether a sheriff’s office acts on behalf of the county or the state for a particular
“issue” or “area”).
85. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1328.
86. E.g., Miller v. Advantage Behav. Health Sys., 677 F. App’x 556, 558–59 (11th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam) (community service board); Lightfoot v. Henry Cnty. Sch. Dist., 771 F.3d 764, 766 (11th Cir.
2014) (school board and school district); Fonte v. Lee Mem’l Health Sys., No. 19-cv-54-FtM-38, 2019
WL 4060163, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2019) (county health system); Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP v.
DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Registration & Elections, 484 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (county board
of registration and elections).
87. Dayton, supra note 4, at 1631.
88. Id. at 1605. For example, the D.C. Circuit examines factors similar to those of the Eleventh Circuit:
(1) the state’s intent as to the status of the entity, including the functions performed by the entity; (2) the
state’s control over the entity; and (3) the entity’s overall effects on the state treasury. P.R. Ports Auth. v.
Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2008). But the D.C. Circuit does not allow for an analysis
of specific functions or activities:
Under the three-factor test, an entity either is or is not an arm of the State: The
status of an entity does not change from one case to the next based on the nature of
the suit, the State’s financial responsibility in one case as compared to another, or
other variable factors. Rather, once an entity is determined to be an arm of the State
under the three-factor test, that conclusion applies unless and until there are relevant
changes in the state law governing the entity.
Id. This all-or-nothing approach can lead courts to make “under- and overinclusive arm-of-the-state status
holdings” that fail to accurately capture the character of the purported state function in question. Dayton,
supra note 4, at 1632.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 12

556

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:2

Amendment in protecting states and the functions that agents carry out
on behalf of states. 89 Yet federal courts’ jurisprudence since Manders
at both the district and circuit levels has given Georgia’s sheriff’s
offices an almost entity-like status as arms of the state in the breadth
of functions accorded Eleventh Amendment immunity.90
C. Pellitteri v. Prine
The court’s precedent established in Manders limited plaintiffs’
ability to bring § 1983 claims against sheriff’s offices for violations
involving use of force and other traditional law enforcement acts.91
Pellitteri v. Prine extended the scope of Eleventh Amendment
immunity beyond enforcement acts into the employment sphere. 92
Felicia Pellitteri, a former deputy sheriff in the Lowndes County
Sheriff’s Office, injured her knee on the job and requested temporary
light duty while she recovered. 93 Sheriff Chris Prine refused to
accommodate Pellitteri’s injury, and the sheriff’s office eventually

89. Dayton, supra note 4, at 1633 (“[The entity-based approach to arm-of-the-state analysis]
undermines the Eleventh Amendment’s goals of protecting only state or state-directed activity.”); see also
id. (“[I]n order to achieve the Eleventh Amendment’s core motivations today, the [arm-of-the-state]
doctrine must adapt to an activity-based model.”); id. at 1627 (“[The activity-based approach] most
accurately reflects and protects the sovereign immunity concerns that motivated the arm-of-the-state
doctrine in the first place.”). In 2006, the Supreme Court briefly engaged in a “function-specific”
arm-of-the-state approach when it determined that a Georgia county did not act as an arm of the state for
the specific function of operating a drawbridge. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham Cnty., 547 U.S. 189, 197
(2006).
90. E.g., Scruggs v. Lee, 256 F. App’x 229, 231–32 (11th Cir. 2007) (function of establishing policies
at local jail for processing arrestees); Lake v. Skelton, 840 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016) (function of
providing food at county jail); Pellitteri v. Prine, 776 F.3d 777, 779 (11th Cir. 2015) (function of hiring
and firing deputies); Brooks v. Wilkinson Cnty., 393 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1157 (M.D. Ga. 2019) (function
of providing medical care at county jail); Temple v. McIntosh Cnty., No. 18-cv-91, 2019 WL 287482, at
*1 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2019) (function of arresting suspect); Townsend v. Coffee Cnty., 854 F. Supp. 2d
1345, 1348–49 (S.D. Ga. 2011) (function of investigatory stop and arrest); Brown v. Newton Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1146, 1149 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (function of employing deadly force
against mentally ill person).
91. Thomas B. Ward, Finding Immunity: Manders v. Lee and the Erosion of § 1983 Liability, 55
MERCER L. REV. 1505, 1520 (2004) (“The aftermath of Manders means that a citizen will not be able to
bring a § 1983 claim against a sheriff in his official capacity in federal court if the sheriff’s action at issue
was done while executing an application of force.”).
92. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 779.
93. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss2/12

22

Lipsett: The Eleventh Circuit's Misguided "Arm-of-the-State" Analysis in Pellitteri v. Prine

2022] THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S MISGUIDED "ARM-OF-THE-STATE"

557

terminated her employment. 94 Pellitteri sued Lowndes County and
Sheriff Prine in his official capacity in federal court, bringing claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.95 Sheriff Prine argued
that he was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the ADA
and § 1983 claims.96
The district court, relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished
opinion three years earlier in Keene v. Prine, found for Pellitteri.97 In
Keene, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the four Manders factors to
determine that Sheriff Prine (the same sheriff sued in Pellitteri) did not
act as an arm of the state regarding the function of terminating his
employees.98 The court pointed to key differences among the degree
of state control, entity funding, and ultimate liability factors implicated
in the use-of-force policy function at issue in Manders with the very
different function of terminating the sheriff’s own employees.99
The Eleventh Circuit overruled its earlier decision in Keene by
reversing the district court and finding that Sheriff Prine acted as an
arm of the state in performing the function of “exercising his power to
hire and fire the deputies that enforce the laws of Georgia on his
behalf.”100 The court trudged through the familiar Manders factors.101

94. Id. In addition, the sheriff’s office replaced Pellitteri with a male deputy and allowed male deputies
to work light-duty jobs after an injury. Pellitteri v. Prine, No. 13-CV-28, 2013 WL 4495847, at *1 (M.D.
Ga. Aug. 21, 2013), rev’d, 776 F.3d 777 (11th Cir. 2015).
95. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 779.
96. Id. Though not mentioned in the text of the opinion, it is possible that Sheriff Prine did not contest
his ability to be sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the Supreme Court has held
that Congress validly abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in passing Title VII under its
powers granted by Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976).
97. Pellitteri, 2013 WL 4495847, at *5 (“While in no way conceding that its initial decision in Keene
was wrong, because of the circumstances presented here, the Court feels bound to follow Keene.”).
98. Keene v. Prine, 477 F. App’x 575, 579–80 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
99. Id. at 578 (“[T]he state’s supervisory authority only allows it to enforce the outermost bounds of
sheriffs’ conduct generally, and the state otherwise does not inject itself into sheriffs’ personnel
decisionmaking.”); id. at 579 (“[T]he County is clearly the principal source of funding for the Sheriff’s
Office, including for personnel expenditures, a fact that weighs against finding that Sheriff Prine acted as
an ‘arm of the state’ here.”); id. (“[I]f a sheriff’s office budget is being used to satisfy adverse judgments
instead of to perform law enforcement activities, then it is up to the county commission to provide
additional funds to the office, or to the county’s voters to replace the sheriff.”).
100. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 779.
101. Id.
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For the first factor—how state law defines the entity—the court
reasoned that the sheriff’s office derives its power from the state and
is largely independent from the county in which it sits.102 In addition,
state law provides that sheriffs control their deputies independently of
county authority, and sheriffs alone have the power to hire and fire
their deputies.103 On the second factor—the degree of control the state
maintains over the entity—the court maintained that the State of
Georgia mandated minimum qualifications for peace officers as well
as created a statewide “Peace Officer Standards and Training Council”
for disciplining law enforcement officers.104 Combined with the
Governor of Georgia’s discretionary investigatory powers over
sheriff’s offices generally, the court determined that Sheriff Prine was
subjected to a “significant” amount of state oversight “even if the State
generally stays out of a sheriff’s day-to-day decisions about who to
hire or fire.”105
On the third factor—where the entity derives its funds—the court
once again distanced itself from its prior conclusion in Keene,
reasoning that the county funded the sheriff’s office pursuant to state
law and could not “dictate” how the sheriff spent his funds despite
actually funding the office. 106 As such, the court “[could] not
conclude” that the factor weighed in favor of granting Eleventh
Amendment immunity.107 Regarding the fourth and final factor—
responsibility for judgments against the entity—the court actually
agreed with its precedent and reasoned that the state treasury would be
“spared” from having to pay for an adverse judgment against Sheriff

102. Id. at 780 (citing GA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, para. 3); see also Bd. of Comm’rs v. Wilson, 396 S.E.2d
903, 903 (Ga. 1990) (“The sheriff . . . is an elected, constitutional officer; he is subject to the charge of
the General Assembly and is not an employee of the county commission.”).
103. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 780 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 15-16-23 (2015)).
104. Id. at 781 (“Admittedly, we stated in Keene that ‘sheriffs are largely independent from the State
when they make personnel decisions’ . . . . Upon further review, however, we believe that this conclusion
in Keene was mistaken . . . .”).
105. Id. at 781–82.
106. Id. at 782.
107. Id. Georgia counties fund their sheriffs’ offices through local taxes. See Keene v. Prine, 477 F.
App’x 575, 578 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Under Georgia law, the county dictates, and has the power
to amend, the sheriff’s overall budget.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-220 (2021) (“County taxes may be levied
and collected . . . to pay sheriffs . . . .”).
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Prine.108 On balance, three factors weighed in favor of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and only the financial responsibility factor cut
the other way.109 The court reversed the district court’s denial of
Sheriff Prine’s motion to dismiss.110
III. PROPOSAL
Since its decision in Manders, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently
found that Georgia sheriffs act as arms of the state in an array of
traditional law-enforcement functions, such as arrest procedures and
jail administration.111 The court’s conclusion in Pellitteri makes it
clear that Georgia sheriffs also enjoy the arm-of-the-state status for the
function of employment decisions, which lie far outside of their core
law-enforcement duties.112 Former deputies who bring suit against
Georgia sheriffs for illegal adverse employment actions now face the
same jurisdictional and procedural hurdles as arrestees and inmates,
who sue the same sheriffs for bodily injury and carceral
mismanagement.113 Parties seeking remedies for such starkly
contrasted harms should not be forced to litigate within the same
immunity sphere. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit should reconsider the
issue of according Georgia sheriffs Eleventh Amendment immunity in
an employment decision-making context. Simply stated, Georgia
108. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 783 (“On this [responsibility for judgments against the entity] factor, we
agree with . . . Keene and Manders . . . because neither the State nor the County will be required to directly
pay for any adverse judgment against the Sheriff’s office.”).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. E.g., Scruggs v. Lee, 256 F. App’x 229, 231–32 (11th Cir. 2007) (function of establishing policies
at local jail for processing arrestees); Lake v. Skelton, 840 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016) (function of
providing food at county jail); Brooks v. Wilkinson Cnty., 393 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1157 (M.D. Ga. 2019)
(function of providing medical care at county jail); Temple v. McIntosh Cnty., No. 18-cv-91, 2019 WL
287482, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2019) (function of arresting suspect); Townsend v. Coffee Cnty., 854 F.
Supp. 2d 1345, 1348–49 (S.D. Ga. 2011) (function of investigatory stop and arrest); Brown v. Newton
Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1146, 1149 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (function of employing deadly
force against mentally-ill person).
112. See generally Pellitteri, 776 F.3d 777.
113. See id. A plaintiff would bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of civil rights
regardless of the context. Compare Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 779 (claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
the employment context), with Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (claim
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force used against plaintiff in a jail). Yet Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not bar Title VII claims. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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sheriffs do not act as arms of the state in making day-to-day
employment decisions. There are two theoretical alternatives that the
court could employ to correctly align its arm-of-the-state analysis with
the realities of a sheriff’s function as an employer.114
A. Employment Decisions Lie Outside of Sheriffs’ State-Empowered
Law Enforcement Functions
Pellitteri’s claims arose out of her allegedly unlawful termination at
the hands of Sheriff Prine.115 Though Pellitteri brought a § 1983 claim
for deprivation of her civil rights, much like plaintiffs who suffered
physical harms carried out by law enforcement officers brought § 1983
claims, the similarities in the cases end at the procedural vehicle
used.116 Eleventh Circuit case law is replete with non-deputy plaintiffs
seeking civil remedies against local sheriffs for abuses of traditional
law enforcement powers; there is a pronounced dearth of former
deputies who bring suits in the employment context. 117 The Eleventh
Circuit’s conclusion that sheriffs act as arms of the state in the
employment decision-making context will likely prove to have a
chilling effect on plaintiffs who attempt to pursue the vindication of
their civil rights. The Eleventh Circuit should seek out an opportunity
to reaffirm its holding in Keene that a sheriff does not act as an arm of
the state in hiring and firing deputies.
1. The Sheriff Is Not a State Entity by Virtue of the Georgia
Constitution, Georgia Statutes, and Georgia Case Law
Sheriff Prine’s decision to terminate Pellitteri was no more than an
unremarkable, supervisory decision fully divorced from state control
or oversight. First, the Georgia Constitution establishes the sheriff as

114. See generally infra Part III.A. & Part III.B.
115. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 779.
116. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Pellitteri, 776 F.3d 777; Keene v. Prine, 477 F. App’x 575 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
These two cases appear to be the only cases involving former deputies terminated by their sheriffs in
contrast to the myriad plaintiffs who bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for abuses of police conduct. See
generally Pellitteri, 776 F.3d 777; Keene, 477 F. App’x 575.
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a county officer.118 Unsurprisingly, Georgia courts have drawn the
same county-officer conclusion given the clarity of the state
constitution.119 Regardless of the clear constitutional text and
longstanding, consistent determination by Georgia state courts, the
court in Manders and Pellitteri decided to treat the county-officer
enumeration as a mere “label.”120
Second, the state has no say over a sheriff’s local employment
decisions because the Georgia General Assembly has given sheriffs
total authority to hire and fire their deputies. 121 The court in Keene
characterized a sheriff’s day-to-day personnel decisions as far
removed from state oversight and contrasted the statutory
independence that sheriffs enjoyed in this area with only the
“outermost bounds” of state involvement and enforcement of a
sheriff’s conduct.122 In Pellitteri, however, the court saw fit to find a
great deal of state involvement with a sheriff’s personnel decisions
“even if the State generally stays out of a sheriff’s day-to-day decisions
about who to hire or fire . . . .”123 So, although the sheriff is an
independent county officer empowered with plenary authority to hire
and fire his or her own deputies, the Eleventh Circuit holds that the
118. GA. CONST art. IX, § 1, para. 3 (“The . . . sheriff . . . shall be elected by the qualified voters of their
respective counties for terms of four years and shall have such qualifications, powers, and duties as
provided by general law.”); see also Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1352 (11th Cir. 2003)
(Barkett, J., concurring) (“Georgia’s highest law is unequivocal in its designation of sheriffs as county,
not state, officials . . . . sheriffs’ status as county officers is clearly reflected in the very organization of
Georgia’s fundamental political charter.”).
119. E.g., Massenburg v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 23 S.E. 998, 999 (Ga. 1895) (“By the uniform law of the
state there was one of such officers to be elected biennially by the people for each county in the state. That
was the exact condition of the office of sheriff, clerk of the superior court, tax collector, coroner; indeed,
all county officers.”); Truesdel v. Freeney, 197 S.E. 783, 786 (Ga. 1938) (“The tax-collector and
tax-receiver and the sheriff function with reference to State matters, as well as county matters; but they
are not regarded as State officers.”); Best v. State, 136 S.E.2d 496, 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964) (“A deputy
sheriff is no more a State officer than a sheriff, and may indeed be less.”); Teasley v. Freeman, 699 S.E.2d
39, 41 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) “([A] sheriff is not an entity entirely separate from the county for all purposes,
rather he is an elected officer operating within the framework of a county as composed by the Constitution
and relevant statutes.”).
120. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 780; Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-16-23 (2021) (“Sheriffs are authorized in their discretion to appoint one or
more deputies.”); see also Warren v. Walton, 202 S.E.2d 405, 409 (Ga. 1973) (“[T]his court has
recognized that ‘deputy sheriffs and deputy jailors are employees of the sheriff, whom the sheriffs alone
are entitled to appoint or discharge.’” (quoting Drost v. Robinson, 22 S.E.2d 475, 480 (Ga. 1942))).
122. Keene, 477 F. App’x at 578.
123. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 782.
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sheriff is also somehow simultaneously a state actor with regards to
mundane personnel decisions removed from state control by the state’s
constitution, statutes, and longstanding case law.124
2. Manders Is Best Read to Accord Eleventh Amendment
Immunity to Sheriffs in Their Execution of Traditional Law
Enforcement Duties
There is little doubt that a sheriff is a state actor in carrying out core
law enforcement functions on behalf of the state. The Manders court
reasoned:
[T]he essential governmental nature of [the sheriff’s] office
is (a) to continue to perform his historical common law
duties to enforce the law and preserve the peace on behalf of
the sovereign State and (b) to perform specific statutory
duties, directly assigned by the State, in law enforcement, in
state courts, and in corrections. Most of those duties are an
integral part of the State’s criminal justice system and are
state functions.
....
. . . The sheriff’s authority to use force or the tools of
violence, whether deadly or non-deadly force, and the
sheriff’s obligation to administer the jail are directly derived
from the State . . . . In addition, use of force and creating
force policy are quintessential policing functions, exercised
by sheriffs in initial arrests, in subduing inmates in sessions
of state superior courts, or in quelling disruptive inmates in
county jails.125
Even when declining to extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to
sheriff’s offices for employment decisions in Keene, the court opined
that a sheriff’s law enforcement functions “effectuate[d] a range of
functions that is primarily, if not exclusively, oriented toward state
124. See supra notes 117–122 and accompanying text.
125. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319.
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ends.”126 It is axiomatic that law enforcement functions constitute state
duties and state prerogatives because the state’s sovereign status rests
on its ability to both make and enforce its laws. 127 Sociologist Max
Weber once famously proclaimed that the modern definition of a state
is a community which can successfully claim a monopoly on
violence.128 The state brings its full arsenal of coercive devices to bear
on unlawful actors through investigation, search, arrest, detention, and
incarceration.129 These “quintessential policing functions” that employ
state-legitimated “tools of violence” are thus the purest expressions of
the state’s functional monopoly on violence. 130 Nowhere is a sheriff
more an arm of the state than in his or her enforcement of the state’s
inherently coercive laws via traditional law enforcement functions.
In Manders, the Eleventh Circuit had no issue concluding that
sheriffs acted for the state in effectuating a use-of-force policy at a jail,
a function necessarily appurtenant to a sheriff’s “historical”
peacekeeping function.131 At the same time, the court took care to
clearly state that it was limiting its arm-of-the-state analysis only to the
use-of-force policy in question. 132 Acknowledging this analytical
126. Keene, 477 F. App’x at 578.
127. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 136 (expanded ed. 2005) (“[P]olitical power is always
coercive power backed by the government’s use of sanctions, for government alone has the authority to
use force upholding its laws.”); cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 111 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1998) (1651) (“The laws of nature . . . without the terror of some power, to cause them to be
observed, are contrary to our natural passions . . . . And covenants, without the sword, are but words . . . if
there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on
his own strength and art, for caution against all other men.”). See generally Grant Lamond, The
Coerciveness of Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2000); Christopher W. Morris, State Coercion and
Force, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 28 (2012).
128. MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION, reprinted in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., Routledge 2009) (1919) (“[F]orce is a means specific to the
state . . . . a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory . . . . [T]he right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions
or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of
the ‘right’ to use violence.”).
129. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 40–41 (Max Knight trans., 1967).
130. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319.
131. Id. at 1313 (“[T]he sheriff, though limited in jurisdiction to his county and generally elected by
county voters, was in reality an officer of the State, and ultimately represented the State in fulfilling his
duty to keep the peace.” (quoting McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 794 (1997))).
132. Id. at 1319 (“We . . . do not, decide today whether Georgia sheriffs wear a ‘state hat’ for Eleventh
Amendment purposes for all of the many specific duties assigned directly by the State . . . . We . . . must
decide here only whether Sheriff Peterson is an ‘arm of the State’ in establishing force policy at the
jail . . . .”).
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restraint, the Keene court distinguished the function of terminating
employees and found it to be largely independent from state control,
in stark contrast to traditional law enforcement and peacekeeping
functions at issue in Manders.133
Obliterating this sound distinction, the Pellitteri court (faultily)
reasoned that sheriffs’ authority to fire their deputies stemmed from
the state because the “legislature has enacted laws giving sheriffs alone
the power to hire their deputies.”134 Using this logic, a court could
conclude that any governmental agency is an arm of the state simply
because it was created by state law.135 Thus, Pellitteri’s precedent not
only impedes plaintiffs’ abilities to remedy violations of their civil
rights but also undermines the very sovereign dignity of the states it
seeks to protect by handing out Eleventh Amendment immunity to
agents whose functions fail to involve the state in any meaningful way.
Reading Manders to accord Eleventh Amendment immunity for
functions that are truly emblematic of state dignity—those that involve
traditional law enforcement and coercive powers—is a more accurate
and faithful interpretation of the modern Supreme Court’s state
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. 136
B. The Court’s Analysis Should Mirror the Twin Aims of the

133. Keene v. Prine, 477 F. App’x 575, 579–80 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
134. Pellitteri v. Prine, 776 F.3d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2015).
135. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1335 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll local government is by definition
a creature of the state’s authority to attach powers and duties to particular offices . . . . the Georgia
Constitution authorizes the state legislature to define the powers and duties of the very officials most
readily associated in Georgia with policy-making on behalf of local governments: county commissioners.
To hold that county commissioners are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity plainly flouts
established law.”); see also Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1351 (11th Cir. 2003) (Barkett, J.,
concurring) (“If any local officeholder whose powers and privileges are defined in some sense by state
law thereby becomes a state agent, there could be no county officers, since all local government is a
creature of state authority.”); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994) (“[U]ltimate
control of every state-created entity resides with the State, for the State may destroy or reshape any unit
it creates.”).
136. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (“The preeminent
purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as
sovereign entities.”).
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Eleventh Amendment
In 1994, the Supreme Court had occasion to yet again consider the
sovereign immunity of a bi-state port authority in Hess v. Port
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.137 Writing for a five-justice plurality,
Justice Ginsburg advanced a new arm-of-the-state analytical
paradigm: “[w]hen indicators of [Eleventh Amendment] immunity
point in different directions, the Eleventh Amendment’s twin reasons
for being remain our prime guide.”138 These twin reasons for being are
(1) state dignity and (2) state financial liability. 139 Importantly, Justice
Ginsburg honed in on the importance of the financial liability aspect
regarding the state’s treasury: “the impetus for the Eleventh
Amendment [is] the prevention of federal-court judgments that must
be paid out of a State’s treasury.”140
If the Eleventh Circuit truly wished for its arm-of-the-state analysis
to comport with the impetus for Eleventh Amendment, it would
jettison its laborious Manders-factors analysis for the superior “twin
reasons” analysis elucidated in Hess.141 In fact, one of the dissenting
opinions in Manders correctly recognized that the Hess analysis
should apply because the arm-of-the-state factors weighed both for and
against Eleventh Amendment immunity for the sheriff’s office, much
like the bi-state port authority did in Hess.142 And though the court
137. See generally Hess, 513 U.S. 30.
138. Id. at 47.
139. Id. at 39–40; Dayton, supra note 4, at 1644 n.209.
140. Hess, 513 U.S. at 48; see also, e.g., Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 631
(2d Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 299 (1990) (“In cases where doubt has existed as to the availability of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Supreme Court has emphasized the exposure of the state treasury as
a critical factor.”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 406 (1821) (“[A]t the adoption of the constitution, all
the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal
Courts, formed a very serious objection to that instrument.”); Fletcher, supra note 23, at 1129 (“[T]he
traditional core of eleventh amendment protection [is] the award of money judgments against the
states . . . .”).
141. The Eleventh Circuit’s proffered reason for adhering to its tiresome Manders test is the saturnine
behemoth known as judicial inertia. In 2016, the court accorded Eleventh Amendment immunity to a
sheriff’s office in the context of providing meals at a county jail. See Lake v. Skelton, 840 F.3d 1334,
1336 (11th Cir. 2016). Judge Parker, echoing Judge Anderson’s dissent over a decade earlier, advocated
for the Hess test. Id. at 1344 (“To the extent that our dissenting colleague [Judge Parker] suggests that this
appeal should be decided based on ‘the Eleventh Amendment’s twin reasons for being,’ . . . we can only
say that we are bound by the test of the en banc majority in Manders, not the dissent.”).
142. See Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1329–32 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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should give dispositive weight to the financial-liability factor (as it
directly stems from the reason for the Eleventh Amendment itself), the
Eleventh Circuit deprives this factor of its central importance to the
analysis by relegating it to just one of four factors to consider. 143
Using the twin-reasons analysis, the Eleventh Circuit in Pellitteri
would likely have found that Sheriff Prine was not acting as an arm of
the state in terminating Pellitteri. First, the court would have found that
the state’s “dignity” was unaffected by denying immunity because the
sheriff is not a state actor with respect to employment decisions—a
sheriff is both a county officer and an independent constitutional
officer with total discretion over hiring and firing employees. 144
Secondly, and more persuasively, the court would have found that the
state’s treasury was unaffected by an adverse judgment because
counties principally fund their sheriff’s offices.145 The Eleventh
Circuit would do well to consider employing the straightforward Hess
methodology rather than trudge through a confounding morass of state
law definitions and control indicia like it did in Manders, Keene, and
Pellitteri.146 The Hess plurality’s analysis provides a simplified
143. Compare Hess, 513 U.S. at 48 (“Courts of Appeals have recognized the vulnerability of the State’s
purse as the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment determinations.”), with Manders, 338 F.3d at
1324, 1329 (“The fourth factor is the source of the funds that will pay any adverse judgment . . . . At a
minimum, this final factor does not defeat immunity.”); see also Manders, 338 F.3d at 1331 (Anderson,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he court overemphasizes the control factor and underemphasizes the state treasury
factor.”).
144. See supra notes 102, 117, 119, and 120; see also Manders, 338 F.3d at 1329–30 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (“The first of the twin reasons asked whether it would be ‘disrespectful’ or a ‘threat to the
dignity’ of the state to require the state to answer the complaint in federal court. Of course, it is well
established that an identical claim against a city or a county—i.e., Manders’ § 1983 excessive force claim
for violating the Eighth Amendment by beating him while in jail—would not be barred by Eleventh
Amendment immunity. I see no greater threat to the dignity of the state in the instant suit against the
Sheriff . . . .”).
145. See supra notes 107–108; see also Pellitteri v. Prine, 776 F.3d 777, 783 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[A]ny
adverse judgment against Sheriff Prine will be paid out of the budget of the Lowndes County Sheriff’s
Office, which is composed of both County and State funds. . . . Nevertheless, to the extent that the state
treasury will be spared here from paying any adverse judgment, this factor weighs in favor of denying
immunity.”).
146. Although the Eleventh Circuit has not yet formally announced a new framework to replace its
Manders analysis, some members of the court are ready to abandon Manders in its entirety. See generally
Andrews v. Biggers, 996 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2021). In Andrews v. Biggers, Judges Wilson and
Rosenbaum concurred with the holding awarding Eleventh Amendment immunity to a Georgia sheriff
only because they were expressly bound to the precedent of Manders and its progeny. Id. at 1236 (Wilson,
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framework that courts can use to more readily arrive at the “dignity”
and “financial liability” impositions undergirding the Eleventh
Amendment.147 And even if the Eleventh Circuit decided to keep its
Manders factors in lieu of adopting the preferable Hess analysis, it
could simply give the financial-liability factor greater weight in the
overall Manders analysis as a first step in aligning its arm-of-the-state
determination with the true driving force behind the Eleventh
Amendment.148
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit purports to focus its arm-of-the-state analysis
on the specific function at issue in each case. 149 This “activity-based”
approach, first defined in Manders, allows for the court to focus on a
narrow action in question rather than on a broad, all-or-nothing
approach that would declare an entity, as a whole, an arm of the
state.150 Hypothetically, plaintiffs seeking redress for deprivations of
their civil rights and violations of federal statutes should see the
Manders analysis as a gift; for when plaintiffs bring claims in federal
court, they perhaps have a chance to convince the judge that the
Manders factors cut in their favor with regard to the specific function
in question.
Unfortunately, plaintiffs can take little solace in the court’s asserted
arm-of-the-state flexibility. The Eleventh Circuit has accorded
Georgia sheriff’s offices Eleventh Amendment immunity across a
broad swath of functions, as evidenced by the court’s jurisprudence
J., concurring); see also id. (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). Their message is clear: “It is time for us to
reevaluate our decision in Manders. Our holding in that case rests on a misinterpretation of Georgia law
and our Eleventh Amendment immunity precedent.” Id. at 1242.
147. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 53; see also L. Pahl Zinn, Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation:
Erosion of the Eleventh Amendment, 4 DET. COLL. L. REV. 1417, 1464 (1995).
148. See Zinn, supra note 147, at 1464 (“The Hess decision establishes a clearer test for Eleventh
Amendment immunity, but does not create a strong framework for its application.”). To keep its existing
arm-of-the-state framework, the Eleventh Circuit could go the route of the First Circuit and “reformulate”
its analysis to incorporate the twin-concerns Hess approach while keeping its trusty Manders factors
intact. See Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
149. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1309.
150. Dayton, supra note 4, at 1632.
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since Manders.151 And the decision in Pellitteri only highlights the
extent of the gradual erosion of § 1983 liability that county sheriffs
have enjoyed for over a decade. 152 If sheriffs act as arms of the state in
making administrative employment decisions at the local level, it is
not unreasonable to anticipate that courts within the Eleventh Circuit
will continue to find state functions in every corner of the county
sheriff’s office.
According to the modern Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment
exemplifies the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. 153 Rather than
explicitly granting states sovereign immunity, the Eleventh
Amendment merely serves as a concrete example of the sovereign
dignity that states retained at the time the Founders ratified the
Constitution.154 Combined with insulation from financial drain on the
state’s treasury (the impetus for the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment), this dignity is reserved for the state and the state’s agents
and instrumentalities.155 The Eleventh Circuit should correct itself and
subscribe to the Supreme Court’s financial-impetus rationale in Hess
by updating its Manders analysis to give greater weight to the
financial-liability factor. If the Eleventh Circuit truly endeavors to
“achieve the purposes” of the Eleventh Amendment in respecting state
dignity and preventing state financial liability, the court would be wise
to stop seeking out increasingly novel ways to accord Eleventh
Amendment immunity to non-state actors.156

151. See supra note 90.
152. Id.
153. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002) (“[T]he Eleventh
Amendment does not define the scope of the States’ sovereign immunity; it is but one particular
exemplification of that immunity.”).
154. See supra note 52.
155. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).
156. Dayton, supra note 4, at 1651.
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